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Introduction  
In England and Wales the Extremist Risk Guidance (ERG22+) has become embedded in both offender 
management and intelligence management systems since 2011. Its conceptual framework has been 
shared across law enforcement and correctional agencies to provide a common approach to 
identifying, managing and addressing extremism, and it has also informed approaches in the 
community with those in the ‘pre-criminal space’ within the UK government’s Prevent agenda (UK 
Government, 2007, 2011). This paper describes this methodology, its origins and approach, and 
reflects a commitment to publish government-based approaches to assessing and managing 
extremism. The authors were at the time this work was carried out both practising forensic 
psychologists within the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) of England & Wales.    
Before this methodology was developed, those convicted under terrorist legislation were typically 
considered by NOMS officials to be high risk of serious harm by virtue of their offence alone, making 
it difficult to deploy case management and operational resources proportionately and to manage 
risk effectively. This became acute following the United Kingdom’s 2006 Terrorism Act that brought 
into custody a significant number of new offenders whose needs and risks were not fully 
understood. A methodology was needed to provide an empirically-based systematic and transparent 
approach to the assessment of risk in those convicted of, or susceptible to extremist offending; to 
inform proportionate risk management; increase understanding and confidence amongst front-line 
staff and decision-makers, and facilitate effective and targeted intervention.  
When this work began there were no established methodologies for assessing risk and need in 
extremist offenders. Levels of trust were low between NOMS officials and the offenders, the latter 
typically did not trust the offender management process and some of those in NOMS who carried 
the risk and responsibility for making risk decisions were sceptical about trusting a new and as yet 
unproven methodology with this group. Negotiating the cooperation of the offenders themselves to 
engage in conversations was a challenging task; tape recording and transcribing interviews was not 
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acceptable to either prison officials, offenders or their lawyers, so the methodology could not be 
developed through a conventional academic approach. Some offenders refused to speak to us, some 
insisted that our interview notes were shared with them and signed by them as a true record and 
some agreed to speak but changed their mind at the last minute.  
Despite these challenges, casework contact gradually grew providing the opportunity to learn about 
pathway influences and susceptibilities. This paper describes how the methodology was developed 
to be clinically sensitive, empirically grounded and ethically defensible.     
 
Definitional and Ethical Issues  
Debate regarding the definitions of extremism and terrorism continues and is outlined extensively 
elsewhere (Schmidt, 1984; Hoffman, 2006). A major challenge is to define these concepts without 
criminalising or pathologising political beliefs or dissent, especially within a democratic, pluralist 
society in which freedom of thought is considered to be an inviolable human right. The offenders we 
worked with took strong exception to being labelled ‘terrorists’ and we had to be very sensitive in 
our use of language and to our role as government officials given that they had offended against the 
state. Extremist offending is defined here as: "Any offence associated with a group, cause or ideology 
that propagates extremist views and actions and justifies the use of violence and other illegal 
conduct in pursuit of its objectives.” (National Offender Management Service, 2007). This definition 
focuses on the criminality deployed on behalf of a group, cause or ideology and the phrase 
‘associated with’ accommodates not only social, political and ideological motivations but also 
opportunistic and criminal. Our position is that in UK society individuals are free to hold any beliefs 
and to express dissent, but where there are democratic means to accommodate this they should not 
resort to breaking the law or to the use of violence.    
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We are aware that this definition is tautologous and potentially hegemonic coming from state 
officials in response to a threat to national security and in the absence of any definition of ‘extremist 
views and actions’. We therefore distinguish the features of extremist thinking from non-extremist 
thinking in relation to the concept of cognitive integrative complexity (Suedfeld, Tetlock & Streufert, 
1992; Liht & Savage, 1992; Savage & Liht, 2008). Extremist views or ideologies are characterised by 
simplistic, reductionist, bi-polar thinking (them and us; persecutors and persecuted; worthy and 
unworthy) which pre-empt argument, are emotionally charged and appeal to the part of our brains 
that mediate fight or flight in response to threat. They are characterised by low integrative 
complexity in that they do not accommodate or integrate multiple perspectives; a mind-set which 
analysis suggests is more likely to lead to conflict and violence in both state and non-state actors 
(Guttieri, Wallace & Suedfeld, 1995; Suedfeld & Bluck, 1988). These similarities in the nature and 
character of extremist thinking - regardless of their specific or unique content - are consistent with 
the commonalities Bjorgo and Horgan, (2009) have identified in right wing and Al-Qaeda (AQ) 
influenced extremist pathways and underlies NOMS approach of treating extremist offenders as a 
single group for assessment and management purposes.  
Another contested term is radicalisation. At the time that this work was undertaken we were aware 
that it lacked rigour as it referred to both a process and an outcome, neither of which were a 
necessary precursor to extremist offending. Neither did it apply to the significant proportion of 
extremist offenders with a criminal background whose motivation was essentially opportunistic. It is 
self-evident that many individuals share extreme beliefs (are ‘radicalised’) but have no intention of 
carrying out an act of terrorism, and that is possible for someone who has carried out a terrorist act 
to desist from violence without relinquishing their ideology or cause. The ERG methodology avoids 
the use of this word, an approach that has been vindicated by recent academic criticism (“Sageman 
Interview”, 2013; “Everything you’ve been told about radicalization is wrong”, 2014).  
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We use instead the terms Engagement to describe the process by which individuals become involved 
with or identify with an extremist group, cause or ideology, and Intent to describe the mind-set 
associated with a readiness to carry out or contribute to an extremist offence. In addition we 
consider the offenders’ Capability to carry out an act of terrorism, producing a three dimensional 
model. Those convicted under terrorist legislation are mostly convicted for offences that fall short of 
an act of violent terrorism.  Some have a clear intent to offend that can be deduced from their 
actions; others are clearly engaged with a group, cause or ideology but do not intend to contribute 
to or carry out an act of terrorism. This is an important distinction to make in assessing risk of harm, 
and the degree of engagement and intent have become crucial in allowing us to make sense of past 
offending and make judgements about possible future offending. Changes in engagement and intent 
may be expressed in terms of disengagement (the opposite of engagement) and/or desistance (the 
opposite of intent).  
 
The Development of the ERG Methodology  
Initially we were wary of using risk assessment protocols developed for criminal violence for those 
whose motivation was apparently political (Roberts & Horgan, 2003; Dernevik, Beck, Grann, Hogue & 
McGuire, 2009; Gudjonsson, 2009) though Roberts and Horgan (2003) have asserted that “effective 
processes for assessing risk of extremist offending do not appear different to those used for assessing 
other types of offending” as long as a causal relationship between putative risk factors and offending 
is not assumed. The use of structured professional guidelines has subsequently been recommended 
by Monahan (2012) in his review of which of the approaches for assessing ‘common violence’ might 
legitimately be applied to violent terrorists. This approach was informed by a small advisory group of 
international experts in assessing risk of serious offending, or in extremism and terrorism who were 
assembled to oversee our work (Including Professors Stephen Hart, David Cook, Andrew Silke, 
Caroline Logan, Hazel Kemshall, Jackie Bates-Gaston and Karl Roberts). They suggested beginning 
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with individual case formulation based on functional analysis of individual offenders, given the lack 
of an existing knowledge base (Roberts & Horgan, 2003; Dernevik et al., 2009). This approach is 
commonly used in forensic and clinical settings for the assessment of problematic clinical 
presentations, and is endorsed in the wider risk assessment literature (Tarrier & Calam, 2012; Lewis 
& Doyle, 2010; Logan & Johnstone, 2012). It makes no assumptions about the etiology of behaviour 
but simply identifies what needs the behaviour is meeting for the individual. The advisory group 
suggested that these needs from the accounts of individual offenders, evidenced also where possible 
from the wider terrorist literature, should then be collated into a set of factors for assessors to 
consider within future case formulations, producing a set of structured professional guidelines. 
Various members of the advisory group continued to oversee this work as it developed, mainly by 
means of individual consultation. They commented on early drafts of the SRG and on its evaluation 
and provided formal feedback of the SRG revision that produced the final ERG (see later). 
Despite the necessity of assessing individual offenders we were aware of the common risk 
assessment error of attributing risk solely to factors within the individual and of overlooking the 
importance of the environment (Monahan, 1995). The ERG necessarily focuses on the individual, but 
it also identifies the role of families and friends in providing support for offending, of groups in 
exerting influence or control over the individual, of transitional periods that provide a cognitive 
opening for potential engagement and of access to networks that can provide, for example, the 
training and funding to realise a terrorist offence. In addition  political context provides both the 
vehicle and the opportunity for the offending (Hoffman, 2006). Professor Stephen Hart – in-line with 
the thinking behind the MLG - specifically advised that we should include this as it was a unique 
feature of extremist offending. This advice was built into the practice guidance as a contextual 
influence to be referenced in the assessment report but it was not included as a factor in its own 
right, which was perhaps an omission.  
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Pathways into Extremist Offending  
Casework with extremist offenders indicated that for those without a criminal background a period 
of conditioning or grooming was typically required in order for them to overcome their inhibitions 
about breaking the law, a process Roberts and Horgan refers to as “socialisation into terrorism” 
(Roberts & Horgan, 2003). This process alters the balance of push and pull factors in favour of 
engagement with a group, cause or ideology. At some point those who completed the pathway 
crossed a threshold between engagement and intent. In order to make sense of how this may 
happen we consulted Ajzen and Fishbein’s (2005) Theory of Reasoned Action, derived from 35 years 
of experimental research. This proposes that action follows intention and is the product of 
behavioural beliefs, normative beliefs and control beliefs that determine ‘attitudes’, ‘subjective 
norm’ and ‘perceived behavioural control’ respectively. Put simply, the motivation to act translates 
into an intention to act when the individual has a positive attitude towards it, when it is anticipated 
that it will bring social approval and where they believe they have the capability to carry it out.  
Applying this theory to the threshold between engagement and intent, for an individual to positively 
contemplate carrying out an act of terrorism a major shift in subjective norm seems necessary to 
change a normative belief that terrorism is abhorrent to an extremist belief that it is legitimate or 
even necessary, promising not only personal reward but social approval. For an individual to arrive 
at this position he or she not only has to overcome their inhibitions against terrorist offending and 
accomplish a major attitude shift, but also has to encounter the political and social circumstances 
that provide the vehicle and the opportunity for this to be accomplished. The Theory of Reasoned 
Action not only helps to clarify the role of attitudes, beliefs and intention, but also accommodates 
the widespread finding that those who commit such offences are generally not suffering from any 
defect of reason and that their behaviour is the product of strategic choice (Crenshaw, 1998), 
notwithstanding that their attitudes and beliefs may have been conditioned or groomed to be far 
from normative.  
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Intent factors represent the end point of Roberts and Horgan’s socialisation into terrorism. Those 
who have arrived at this point by such a route typically have the following features: they over-
identify with an ideology, group or cause to the extent that they have lost their personal identity and 
agency; they have accepted a single narrative explanation of world events; they have adopted 
polarised thinking that divides the world into persecutors (them) and persecuted (us); they have 
made a moral judgement about the out-group as unworthy in contrast to the righteousness of the 
in-group and acquired attitudes that justify violence in pursuit of their noble cause, telling 
themselves that the end justifies the means. They have engaged their emotional brains and 
immersed themselves in stories of heroism, honour and gallantry. This mind-set corresponds with a 
low level of ‘integrative complexity’ (Suedfeld, Tetlock & Streufert, 1992) as described above. 
Psychologically a collective identity displaces individual identity with its associated inhibitions 
against violence (Schwartz, Dunkel & Waterman, 2009). 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to outline in detail other theories that may explain the 
mechanisms whereby individuals become identified with extremist groups, causes or ideologies, 
how certain personality traits may find expression in the extremist identity and lifestyle or how 
groups exert their influence. However, promising avenues include identity theory (Erikson, 1968; 
Marcia, 1993; Schwartz et al., 2009) authoritarian personality theory (Altemeyer, 2004) and social 
psychological theories of group influence and prejudice (Tajfel & Hurner, 1986; Brewer & Hewstone, 
2004).  
 
A Criminal Pathway  
Over time further casework identified cases that did not accord with the theory that all extremist 
offenders were socialised into committing extremist offences. Several convicted AQ influenced 
offenders had a history of violent offending and a seemingly fragile identification with ideology. They 
held criminal attitudes supportive of violence and two had carried out acts of serious violence in 
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custody. Their involvement appeared to be opportunistic and self-serving and they did not share the 
same belief system or religiosity as other AQ influenced offenders. Assessment of these individuals 
identified a high level of social dominance, aggression, intimidation and exploitation of others 
through fear, as well as narcissism and sensation seeking, suggesting that they were motivated by 
the exercise of power and control rather than ‘noble cause’. Others whose motivation was political 
and moral were often disparaging of them, recognising that their motivation and values were at 
odds with their own.  
The finding that some with criminal capability had deployed their skills to assist extremists despite 
having little interest in their cause resulted in the inclusion of opportunistic motivation as an 
alternative to political/moral motivation as an engagement factor, and the addition of criminal 
history as a further capability factor. The implication is that there may be more than a single linear 
pathway into extremism; one that is essentially political that progresses through engagement to 
intent and another that is essentially criminal progressing from a pre-existing level of intent and 
capability to include an opportunistic and fragile level of engagement.  
 
The First Structured Risk Guidance  
The first Structured Risk Guidance (SRG) was developed in 2009 from early casework with 
approximately 20 convicted extremist offenders who were prepared to speak with us about their 
offending. In time our findings were cross referenced against those from an independent researcher 
and youth leader commissioned by London Probation to identify influences in the backgrounds of 
another 12 offenders convicted under the Terrorist Act and on licence in the community (Karmani, 
2009). From these two independent sources there was a significant convergence of findings that we 
were able to cross-reference against government commissioned reviews of the literature on terrorist 
offending. Twenty-one features were identified as common pathway influences that were also 
endorsed in the literature as seemingly significant. These were collated into formal guidelines for 
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preparing individual formulations of risk and need. A range of staff disciplines were provided with a 
day’s training in the guidelines, following which the SRG was piloted in custody and the community.  
Insert Figure 1 here* 
From a structured interview that explored these 21 factors, trained assessors were required to 
assess risk in terms of four dimensions: Beliefs, Motivation, Intent and Capability.  These were 
intended to capture the areas that were relevant to the degree of commitment to an extremist 
ideology, group or cause, seriousness of harm and the likelihood of  a future extremist offence. 
Trained multi-disciplinary staff from the same establishments were asked - where possible - to 
complete the assessments together to create a shared formulation.  
An independent evaluation in 2010 by the National Centre for Social Research focussed on the 
content, delivery and implementation of the SRG (Webster, Kerr & Tompkins, in MOJ press). It 
included interviews with stakeholders, assessors and offenders in both prisons and probation sites. 
Assessors indicated that the SRG provided procedural clarity, improved partnership working and 
increased their professional competence, confidence and sense of legitimacy in their role. Others 
said they would like further guidance on how the relatively generic needs identified by the 21 factors 
informed the assessment of risk of serious harm. In addition, the shared formulation approach was 
considered less efficient and effective than when assessments had been completed by a lead 
assessor (usually a psychologist) but who consulted other staff for their opinions and information. 
Offenders reported that the process improved their perceptions of staff and increased their 
willingness to engage with them and with the regime, affirming its value in establishing 
communication and building trust between those who had offended against the state and those who 
represented its authority. 
Revisions to the SRG streamlined the factors and added in some others, clarified the stages of 
assessment and provided further practice guidance. By this time, casework experience with 
extremist offenders had grown and more clarity was emerging about common pathway influences 
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and failures of protection. It became increasingly evident that the susceptibilities were generic 
across different causes and ideologies, associated broadly with grievance, threat, identity and status 
issues, facilitated by a cognitive opening often associated with a transitional period in the 
individual’s life. Also important was the absence of other sources of self-efficacy, security, identity 
and status that might have protected against their involvement, emphasising the importance of 
protective factors. 
Feelings of grievance and injustice were emerging as the most frequent common denominator.   
Emotional resilience and problems with relationships remained relevant but were captured by other 
vulnerabilities including mental health and transitional periods, some of which were associated with 
relationship breakdown. A complex of features were emerging from assessment that were 
associated with criminality: dominance, risk taking/sensation seeking (need for excitement), 
attitudes that justified offending and criminal capability. SRG factors 7 and 18 were therefore recast 
as ERG factors 7 and 9, capturing the distinction between political and opportunistic motivation. In 
addition the work of Altemeyer, 2004 in the USA informed the features of authoritarian dominant 
and submissive personalities that were captured within a need for status and/or dominance and 
susceptibility to indoctrination respectively (ERG factors 4, 6 and 7).  
SRG Factor 17 was broken down further in response to the unexpected finding that offenders 
differed considerably in what they wanted to achieve and what they would do to achieve it. In 
France for example, those in custody for extremist offences, mainly of Moroccan heritage, typically 
wished to establish Islamic government in their host country and were very antagonistic to what 
they perceived as this country’s racist policies (Khosrokhavar, 2006). In the UK none of the British AQ 
influenced offenders we spoke to wanted to establish Islamic government in the UK. On the whole 
they retained an affection for their country and for the freedoms and respect they were afforded 
here. Their goals were to alleviate the suffering of Muslims elsewhere and to express their 
antagonism to British and American foreign policy in Muslim countries. Their end objectives 
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therefore were not necessarily harmful, though what they were prepared to do to achieve them 
was, in varying degrees. In contrast the objectives of those with extreme right wing beliefs were to 
forcibly repatriate those from a non-white ethnic background or to eliminate them in a final ‘holy 
war’. This became an important distinction to make in terms of risk assessment: who did the 
offender wish to harm, on what scale and to what end? These areas are captured by ERG Intent 
factors 5 and 6.         
Insert Figure 2 here* 
 
A Dimensional Model  
In the ERG, the factors have been brigaded under three dimensions of Engagement, Intent and 
Capability that clarifies their relationship to risk as well as to need. Engagement replaced Beliefs and 
Motivation from the SRG. Engagement was a term emerging in the literature that reflected a 
commitment to ideology, group or cause, and feedback from assessors was that relevant beliefs 
could be adequately captured by the engagement factors. The three dimensions of the ERG are not 
derived therefore from statistical analysis but from a conceptual understanding of the functional 
distinction between engagement and intent and the self-evident relevance of capability to extremist 
offending.  
In line with Ajzen and Fishbein’s (2005) theory of reasoned action we separated the original SRG 
factors that accounted for the individual’s engagement with ideology or cause from those associated 
with a readiness to offend; the former constituting ‘engagement’ factors and the latter constituting 
‘intent’ factors. This separation was broadly endorsed within two national exercises in which a total 
of 35 offender managers supervising extremist offenders were asked to place the original SRG 
factors along a pathway either side of a threshold that represented readiness to offend.  
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The first dimension therefore concerns the process of engagement and includes the factors that 
motivate an individual to engage with a group, cause or ideology. The second concerns the degree of 
intent or readiness to offend associated with the individual mind-set, including what they would do 
and to what end. The third concerns the individual’s capability of carrying out an act of terrorism.  
The dimension of capability emerged from the finding that many terrorist offences had failed or 
been sub-lethal in their impact due to the offenders’ lack of capability to carry them out. This could 
take the form of a lack of personal resource such as finance, knowledge, skill or resilience, or a lack 
of access to resources for terrorism such as social capital or networking ability. Aspects of capability 
can also provide information about intent where individuals had clearly developed a capability for 
terrorism through, for example, amassing materials for bomb making or reconnoitring possible 
terrorist sites. Experience suggests that capability is perhaps the most difficult dimension to assess 
and requires clarity over what level of capability is of concern. The killing of an off-duty British 
soldier in Woolwich, London in 2013 showed that individuals do not need advanced capability and 
resources to commit an act that has significant impact. However, for all its challenges it remains an 
important dimension to consider in assessing the potential nature and lethality of an extremist 
offence.  
Guidance helps assessors to consider the role and function a particular factor may play in 
contributing to an individual’s offending. Not all will be relevant to every offender and factors may 
play various or multiple roles. For example family or friends may either encourage or discourage 
involvement depending on whether they share sympathy for the ideology. Mental health may exert 
a pathway influence in multiple ways, or not at all. The extremist identity can meet needs for status, 
empowerment and revenge in those with narcissistic, paranoid or anti-social personality traits, and 
disinhibition can be associated with callousness, lack of empathy or a sense of entitlement. The ERG 
is careful not to assume the function or role that factors or circumstances play in the offending even 
though their typical role is described in the accompanying guidance. This feature distinguishes the 
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ERG from approaches that assign a score for each factor that builds into a total score for each 
domain. Within the ERG items are not scored as their role is qualitative, not summative; more 
factors do not equate with a higher level of engagement, the combination of factors simply tell the 
risk ‘story’.  
Factors and dimensions are dynamic and subject to change over time (with the exception of criminal 
history). Bjorgo and Horgan (2009) identify that engagement depends on a dynamic balance of push 
and pull factors and McCauley and Segal (1989) point out that an extremist is either becoming 
engaged, being engaged or in the process of disengaging. The assessment is therefore designed to 
measure changes in engagement, intent and capability and the implications for disengagement 
and/or desistance over time. Assessment of the presence and role of protective factors on each of 
these dimensions also ensures that positive changes are reflected over time. These identify the 
circumstances or influences that may counter the influence of risk factors. Their importance is 
endorsed in the terrorist literature (Hoffman, 2006; Hogan, 2009; Jacobsen, 2010) and they are 
commonly included in risk assessment protocols. This focus on risks, needs and protective factors as 
targets for intervention or management are distinctive features that allows decision makers to 
systematically consider how changes in individual susceptibilities and circumstances may reduce as 
well as increase future risk.  
Conceptualising risk in terms of three dimensions therefore accommodates the apparent disconnect 
between engagement and intent, identifies the psychological hooks that can be targets for change, 
underscores the central importance of behavioural intent for future risk and provides a framework 
for making risk judgements and developing risk management strategies. As the three dimensions are 
essentially dynamic the assessment can be repeated within annual sentence plan reviews and parole 
reviews in order to provide an updated assessment of risk and need.  
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Completing the ERG 22+ 
Rather than work through the list of factors assessors consider four questions that broadly structure 
their interviews and analysis. These are: 1) What contextual circumstances seem to have contributed 
(or could contribute) to their offending?  2) What personal attributes (needs, susceptibilities) seem 
to have contributed (or could contribute) to their offending? 3) What did the person get out of (or 
could get out of) their offending? 4) What circumstances or attributes could protect them from 
offending in the future? The 22 ERG factors are consulted for their relevance, and the + suffix 
accommodates any other factor/s that appears relevant. Case formulation allows for the possibility 
that other factors not previously identified may emerge as significant in the individual case, and 
ensures they are not overlooked, and that assessment is individualised. It also  allows the ERG to 
adapt as the evidence base develops. In the practice guidance assessors are provided with a 
description of the factor, examples of its presence or absence, and suggested protective factors. A 
record form is provided to note the presence and significance of relevant factors and how they may 
impact on risk.  Practice guidance also includes the rationale for the role of each factor and the 
evidence for it from both the wider literature and from casework.  
Assessors are asked to use their judgement to consider the role these factors played in the offence 
and could play in the future, how they map on to the three dimensions of engagement, intent and 
capability and what influences may protect individuals from being drawn into future offending. Case 
formulation is not simply a ‘tick-box’ approach, but requires careful analysis of the individual push 
and pull factors and the context of the offending, to build credible hypotheses about risk and need. 
Conclusions are then drawn from this analysis to inform risk decisions and risk management 
strategies within a written report. 
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Features of the ERG 22+ 
The ERG is a manualised assessment consistent with other contemporary methodologies that assess 
risk of offending, such as the recently revised Historical, Clinical & Risk Management -20 (HCR-20 
Version 3) for violent offenders (Douglas, Hart, Webster, & Belfrage, 2013), or the Risk of Sexual 
Violence Protocol (RSVP) for sexual offenders (Hart, Kropp & Laws, 2003). Both the HCR-20 and RSVP 
are internationally evidence-based structured risk guidelines that assess the historical and clinical 
factors empirically linked with non-sexual and sexual violence respectively, alongside factors that 
concern risk management. These inform conclusions about the likelihood, imminence and nature of 
future violence and probable victims, and how this risk may be effectively managed. Like these 
guidelines, the ERG is manualised and includes features such as an overview of its applications and 
limitations; administration procedures; descriptions and rationale for its risk and protective factors, 
and academic references.   
The ERG is not as yet informed by an equivalent evidence base primarily because of the paucity of 
equivalent research into factors underlying extremist offending. Assumptions are avoided about the 
genesis of extremist violence and the methodology is intended to capture the learning from 
casework as it develops. The ERG when it was formally adopted in 2011 was based on empirical data 
from the offence accounts of upwards of 40 convicted extremist offenders (approximately 30% of 
the total population in custody or under licence in NOMS at this time) alongside case information 
from the wider literature and research commissioned under the UK government Prevent initiative 
(Home Office, 2011). The factors are also grounded in mainstream psychological theories. The ERG is 
only completed by qualified forensic psychologists or probation officers who are experienced in 
complex risk assessment and who have completed ERG specific training over two days, which 
includes applying the assessment to practice cases. Trainees are licensed to use the guidelines and 
access is restricted to those who are trained in order to prevent their use by anyone who does not 
appreciate their provenance and limitations.  
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The Relationship between the ERG and Other Tools for Assessing Violent Extremism  
When this methodology was first developed in 2009 there was only one other risk framework in 
development for the assessment of extremist offenders, and no outcome studies that could inform 
an actuarial approach because of the small numbers involved and the lack of re-conviction data. The 
developer of the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment, now in its second version (VERA 2) consulted 
us about whether we could develop a single framework in collaboration (Pressman, 2009; Pressman 
& Flockton, 2012), but we came to recognise that the goals and purpose of our assessments were 
different. The ERG had to accommodate those convicted of extremist offences that fell short of 
extremist violence, in line with UK legislation which set the bar lower than other jurisdictions. Indeed 
factors in the VERA 2 such as ‘seeker, consumer, developer of extremist materials’ constitute 
offences in themselves in the UK. In addition, our work needed to identify the dynamic needs and 
susceptibilities that might become the target for intervention or management, be sensitive to 
change over time, and encompass extremist offenders as a generic group. To achieve this, the ERG 
adopts a case formulation approach in which assessors consider not only the presence of a factor 
but also its role in the offence (including those that may be idiosyncratic to the individual) to inform 
a nuanced conclusion about risk and protection; whereas the VERA 2 typically focuses on the 
presence of factors alone to inform an overall risk decision.   
The VERA 2 was not intended as a correctional tool but simply as a means to assess the risk of 
violent extremism. For our purposes we needed to determine the actual engagement influences for 
extremist offenders in the UK at this time in order to be confident that we understood their 
pathways and objectives. At this point we had already been surprised that many of our assumptions 
about motivation and goals had been challenged. The ERG is therefore informed by casework with 
UK convicted terrorists, cross referenced to the literature where this provides corroboration, but 
essentially evidenced by the offenders themselves, whereas the VERA 2 is a conceptual formulation 
of 31 items grouped into five categories informed largely by the literature (Beliefs and Attitudes; 
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Context and Intent; History and Capability; Commitment and Motivation and Protective items). 
However, the VERA 2 is similar to the ERG in its general approach (applying structured professional 
judgement); some dimensions (intent and capability), some factors (e.g. grievance, dehumanisation, 
indoctrination), and in its focus on protective factors and standards for administration.  
These similarities are shared with the Multi-Level Guidelines (MLG), a set of structured professional 
guidelines to assess group based violence that aspires to include organised crime, gangs, freeman 
sovereign (anti-government) citizens, terrorism and honour based violence (Cook, Hart and Kropp 
2014). The MLG groups risk factors from the literature within a nested ecological model with 
Individual, Individual-Group, Group and Group-Societal domains. Like the VERA 2 that is specifically 
intended to assess violence in the context of extremism, the MLG is specifically intended to assess 
violence in the context of groups, and their respective factors are informed by systematic searches 
of the literature by these terms. In contrast, the ERG is concerned to capture the pathway influences 
(especially motivating factors) in those convicted of extremist offences in order to understand how 
they became engaged and to facilitate their dis-engagement or desistance. It is specifically 
concerned to assess their intentions, both in terms of what they would have done had they not been 
apprehended, and to what end, and their capability of carrying it out.  
In contrast to both the VERA 2 and the MLG, in the ERG there are no factors that refer directly to 
violence. Most of those convicted of terrorist offences in the UK have no history of violence, though 
some do. Their convictions are rarely for violent offences but essentially for contributing to, 
supporting or plotting extremist offences. In terms of administration, the MLG advocates that case 
formulation is completed by a group, whereas the ERG is now completed by a single assessor 
following the feedback from the SRG pilot that found this to be problematic in our particular setting. 
Again, it is not surprising that there are significant overlaps between the ERG and MLG given that 
Professor Stephen Hart was both part of the expert group for the development of the ERG and one 
of the authors of the MLG. 
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However, it is the case that the ‘lab environment’ and academic context in which the VERA 2 and 
MLG respectively were developed has supported a more systematic and academic approach. The 
developer of the MLG built in an assessment of interrater reliability within the pilot training, an 
opportunity that we missed and that is only now being corrected through a dedicated interrater 
reliability study.  
 
The Utility of the ERG  
In addition to the general endorsement of the utility of the pilot version of the ERG,  (See Webster, 
Kerr & Tompkins, in MOJ press), the final version was peer-reviewed within NOMS and by two of the 
international experts in risk assessment from the original advisory group, Professors Stephen Hart 
(Simon Fraser University, Canada) and David Cook (Glasgow Caledonian University, Scotland). Their 
feedback was that the guidelines would serve both to educate staff and to guide practice as well as 
stimulate further work in the field. The evidence base was considered to be well summarized and 
the best available at this time; the guidelines were explicit and well organized; the focus consistently 
practical; with appropriate emphasis on assessors needing to be organized, systematic, thorough, 
experienced, trained, and free of assumptions. The ERG was considered to be equal or superior to 
existing alternatives at the time. Following approval, the SRG was formally renamed the Extremism 
Risk Guidelines (ERG) 22+ in 2011 and mainstreamed for use across NOMS.  
Since this time the ERG has become embedded within the National Offender Management Service 
and is used to inform decisions about sentence planning, relocation, intervention, re-integration, 
parole, release, recall, licence conditions and supervision. All convicted extremist offenders, a total 
of over 150 individuals from a range of extremist affiliations have now been assessed (including 
those associated with far-right, nationalist-separatist and animal rights groups). The ERG has played 
a critical role in informing decisions that concern convicted extremist offenders across NOMS, 
including how they are managed, supervised and monitored; what interventions they complete, 
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whether these have impacted on risk, and whether and how they should be located, relocated, 
released and reintegrated into society, or recalled into custody.   
The ERG has also been adapted to create the Extremism Risk Screen (ERS), a shortened version of 
the ERG which asks key questions under the three headings of engagement, intent and capability.  
The ERS is designed to assist prison and probation officials assess information about an offender’s 
possible involvement or interest in extremist groups, causes or ideas. This is used with offenders 
with no previous convictions for extremist offences. It directs the attention of security staff, police 
liaison officers and offender managers to the dimensions that are deemed to bear on risk. A shared 
discussion allows them to evaluate the credibility of concerns and decide whether and how to 
intervene; one possible outcome being the completion of a full ERG assessment to provide a more 
complete picture.  
The Home Office Channel project that operates in the community to support and intervene with 
those vulnerable to extremism uses the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (UK Government 
2012)1 derived from the ERG to assess vulnerability and monitor the impact of interventions. 
Confidence in its use is associated with the fact that it is derived from the actual pathway 
experiences of the ‘true positives’ or those who have been convicted of terrorist offences.  
The ERG allows those working in counter-terrorism from different agencies to use a common 
language that allows focused discussion and consistent decision making across custody and the 
community. Important decisions have to be made about extremist offenders on a daily basis and the 
ERG provides a systematic, transparent and accountable framework that structures that and 
supports defensible decision making.  
 
                                                          
1 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118187/vul-
assessment.pdf 
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The Validity of the ERG  
There is evidence from both experience and evaluation that the ERG has both face and content 
validity (Webster, Kerr & Tompkins, in MOJ press). There is also a degree of convergent validity in 
the overlap between some of the ERG factors and those within the Violent Extremism Risk 
Assessment Version 2 (VERA 2) and the Multi-Level Guidelines (MLG) for group-based violence, 
though this is not surprising given that all have been informed directly or indirectly by a common 
literature and mutual consultation. The widespread use of the ERG demonstrates its face validity and 
utility but cannot be taken as a substitute for predictive validity which many consider to be the gold 
standard for forensic instruments. This is commonly derived from regression analysis of reconviction 
data, but this is difficult with this offender group for a number of reasons. Re-offending may be 
prevented by the level of monitoring, surveillance, licence restrictions and ready recall that currently 
accompanies their release Those convicted may well withdraw from a front line role once they have 
become known to police and security services and remain undetected although still involved. Many 
of the more serious extremist offenders are serving very long minimum terms, and those who 
carried out suicide bombings did not survive their offence. Those with a criminal history will be more 
likely to re-offend, though not necessarily commit extremist offences, and current manifestations of 
extremism may spontaneously diminish as the political climate changes.  
Negligible extremism re-offending rates will require softer outcomes for analysis that may shed less 
light on the predictive power of the methodology.. Given these issues, research that helps identify 
how the ERG contributes to decision making  that maintains desistance may be a more fruitful and 
realistic objective than  the sole pursuit  of predictive validity.    
NOMS is currently exploring from competed ERG assessments which factors are generic and which 
specific to different types of extremist offending, and what may protect against them. An interrater 
reliability study is also being completed. As with other risk and need instruments, ongoing studies 
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will develop our understanding of this area of risk and of the performance of the instrument, and 
result in adaptations to the ERG over time.   
On the plus side, the individual factors have been derived from the engagement pathways of the 
‘true positives’, and to that extent are empirically grounded. The role of individual factors and 
dimensions are also underpinned by mainstream psychological knowledge that explains the 
importance of personal and social identity, status, the role of groups, the appeal of the extremist 
identity to particular personality traits, the role of integrative complexity in understanding the mind-
set of intent and how a combination of motivation, attitudes, and self-efficacy can reach a tipping 
point in the decision to take action. The terrorist literature has also been a constant touchstone and 
source of evidence for each development in the methodology. This all provides a sound foundation 
for further validity studies. 
 
The Limitations of the ERG  
The current lack of demonstrated reliability and validity remain the main limitations of the ERG at 
this time.  It remains essentially a qualitative tool that requires a level of professional judgement and 
experience to be used effectively.  
The ERG requires assessors to have a level of political awareness in the area of extremism in 
question. Without regular use, which is difficult with relatively few extremist offenders, they have 
limited opportunity to gain this knowledge and maintain their expertise, such that political, cultural 
and social context, together with protective factors can potentially slip from the analysis.  
Another possible limitation is that it was constructed to primarily capture the particular pathway 
influences and objectives of British AQ influenced extremist offenders during the period of the 
Afghan and Iraqi wars. It has already been established that they differed in objectives from their 
French counterparts, though the inclusion of a specific factor concerning objectives should ensure 
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that changes in objectives are captured as they evolve.  In the UK the ERG has been found to support 
assessment with extreme right wing offenders, animal rights activists, female extremists and gang 
members who’s offending is based on joint enterprise. It is likely therefore to continue to prove 
useful in assessing manifestations of extremism elsewhere as the geo-political situation evolves. 
 
Conclusion 
The ERG is work in progress. This paper has described its origins in the analysis of the true positives - 
those convicted of terrorist offences in the UK, which is perhaps both a strength and a weakness. It 
is the only approach, to our knowledge, that has derived such a methodology from direct contact 
with those convicted of terrorist offences as well as the wider literature. The circumstances of its 
development however may have detracted from its academic credentials in that it was not based on 
recorded and transcribed interviews, systematically analysed, or a transparent and replicable 
literature review conducted specifically for this purpose. We came to this work as practitioners with 
a strong imperative to develop products for correctional and managerial purposes. Now that the 
ERG dimensional model has become embedded in NOMS and a significant number of assessments 
have been completed, efforts are being made to further analyse its performance and to validate it 
more systematically.  
There remain important questions to be explored, most notably around reliability and validity, but in 
the meantime the ERG provides a systematic, transparent and accessible framework for engaging, 
assessing and managing extremist offenders and those vulnerable to engagement, in prison and the 
community. Such an approach is crucial in this field where public protection is a primary 
consideration and decision making needs to be both transparent and defensible.    
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Figure 1: SRG Factors 
 
1. Lack of emotional resilience  
2. Problems with Relationships  
3. Need to feel important, valued or special  
4. Need for identity, meaning and belonging  
5. Feelings of threat and insecurity  
6. Sensitivity to perceived injustice  
7. Idealism and political naivety  
8. Susceptibility to charismatic individuals 
9. Susceptibility to indoctrination 
10. Susceptibility to group influence and control  
11. The family and/or community support extremist offending  
12. Over-identification with a cause  
13. Attitudes that justify offending  
14. ‘Us and Them Thinking’ 
15. Need for stimulation and excitement  
16. Desire to experience themselves as a hero, soldier or person of honour   
17. Intent to bring about harmful regime change   
18. Opportunistic involvement  
19. Individual knowledge, skills and competencies to commit extremist offences  
20. Access to networks, funding and equipment to commit extremist offences  
21. Diagnosis of Mental Illness & Personality Disorder  
Any Other Area Relevant to Risk  
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Figure 2: ERG 22+ Dimensions and Factors 
 
Engagement  
    
1. Need to redress injustice and express grievance    
2. Need to defend against threat 
3. Need for identity, meaning, belonging   
4. Need for status   
5. Need for excitement, comradeship or adventure  
6. Need for dominance 
7. Susceptibility to indoctrination  
8. Political/moral motivation 
9. Opportunistic involvement 
10. Family or friends support extremist offending 
11. Transitional periods 
12. Group influence and control 
13. Mental health  
 
Intent 
1. Over-identification with a group or cause 
2. Us and Them thinking 
3. Dehumanisation of the enemy 
4. Attitudes that justify offending 
5. Harmful means to an end 
6. Harmful end objectives 
 
Capability 
1. Individual knowledge, skills and competencies  
2. Access to networks, funding and equipment 
3. Criminal history 
+     Any other factor 
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